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INTERMITTENT CONSEQUENCES AND PROBLEM SOLVING:
THE EXPERIMENTAL CONTROL OF "SUPERSTITIOUS" BELIEFS
RUTH A. HELTZER and STUART A. VYSE
Connecticut College
Three groups of college students were asked to determine
how points were earned in a task that allowed the assessment of
response variability. All students received points for sequences of
eight presses distributed across two keys (four presses on each
key). One group received a point for each correct sequence, one
group received points on a fixed-ratio 2 schedule, and one group
received points on a random-ratio 2 schedule. There were no
significant differences in nonverbal response variability across the
three groups, and the fixed-ratio 2 and random-ratio 2 groups
obtained equivalent point totals. However, participants in the
random-ratio group were significantly more likely to write verbal
descriptions of the task that made reference to performance-
consequence relations that were not in effect. The results
demonstrate that superstitious rule generation is more probable
when consequences are random and not merely intermittent.
When people are exposed to operant contingencies without benefit
of instruction, they frequently generate descriptions of the events they
experience. A child playing with a new toy can soon articulate the
principles of its use, and an experienced surgeon can suggest
techniques that will improve the likelihood of a successful operation.
Although this process of rule generation often leads to accurate
descriptions of the environmental contingencies (or of behavior adapted
to these contingencies), in some cases inaccurate rules result.
Furthermore, if supported by the environment, inaccurate contingency
statements can persist and control forms of responding that are poorly
matched to the demands of the task (Leander, Lippman, & Meyer, 1968;
Vyse, 1991).
When Skinner (1948) discovered that the regular presentation of
food to a hungry pigeon, without reference to its behavior, produced
An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the American
Psychological Association on August 11, 1990 in Boston. Correspondence should be
addressed to Stuart A. Vyse, Department of Psychology, Box 5621, Connecticut College,
New London, CT 06320. Internet: savys@conncoll.edu.
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stereotyped, idiosyncratic responding, he called such behavior "a sort of
superstition" (p. 171) because "the bird behaves as if there were a
causal relation between its behavior and the presentation of food" (p.
171). More recent research has challenged the idea that Skinner's
pigeons exhibited operant superstitions (Killeen, 1977; Staddon &
Simmelhag, 1971; Timberlake and Lukas, 1985); however, this
controversy notwithstanding, several studies with human participants
have demonstrated superstitious conditioning of nonverbal behavior
(e.g., Ono, 1987; Wagner & Morris, 1987). Drawing on this earlier work,
the present investigators have adopted the term superstitious rule to
refer to a verbal statement of contingencies or performance-outcome
relations that are not in effect.
A variety of environmental contexts are associated with the
generation of inaccurate rule statements, ranging from restricted
descriptions of the true contingencies (e.g., Schwartz, 1982; Vyse, 1991)
to completely superstitious accounts of the environmental demands
(e.g., Catania & Cutts, 1989). For example, superstitious rules and
nonverbal responding are observed in many human participants under
fixed interval (Fl) schedules. Research in human schedule performance
revealed two distinct patterns of Fl behavior in language-competent
participants. Although infants showed the familiar scalloped pattern
universally found in nonhumans (Bentall, Lowe, & Beasty, 1985), adults
typically responded at either a high, steady rate or a very low rate, often
making only a single response per interval (Leander et al., 1968).
Furthermore, in postexperimental interviews, low-rate responders
reported that reinforcement was dependent on the passage of time;
whereas high-rate responders, who frequently emitted hundreds of key
presses per interval, expressed the belief that reinforcement was
contingent upon a certain number of responses (Leander et al., 1968;
Lowe, 1979).
Catania and Cutts (1963) demonstrated that both superstitious rules
and superstitious nonverbal behavior could be produced through
adventitious reinforcement. College students pressing buttons for points
under concurrent variable interval (VI) extinction (EXT) schedules
showed stable responding on the EXT button. In addition, most
participants reported that the VI button produced reinforcement only
after a certain number of presses on the EXT button. The introduction of
a changeover delay eliminated both superstitious verbal and
superstitious nonverbal behavior.
In a study of behavioral stereotypy, Schwartz (1982) found that when
reinforcement was made available for any of 70 sequences of eight
presses on two keys, college students adopted a single dominant
sequence. Later, when asked how reinforcement was obtained, most
participants reported that the sequence they had adopted was the only
one that produced points. They had mistaken a sufficient solution for a
necessary one.
Using a similar matrix task, Vyse (1991) found that college students
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who received random-ratio (RR) 2 reinforcement for some sequences
through the matrix and fixed-ratio (FR) 1 reinforcement for others were
more likely to describe contingencies that were not in effect (e.g., points
are earned by executing a sequence of four paths through the matrix)
than those not exposed to RR reinforcement. Building on this earlier
work, the present investigation was designed as a direct examination of
the effects of intermittent consequences on the accuracy of participants'
descriptions of experimental task demands. To determine whether
inaccurate rule statements were the result of random consequences or
merely of intermittent ones, some participants were exposed to an RR 2
schedule of reinforcement and others to an FR 2 schedule. Because
previous studies have implicated both externally provided instructions
(Baron & Galizio, 1983; Hayes, Brownstein, Haas, & Greenway, 1986;
Matthews, Shimoff, Catania, & Sagvolden, 1977; Shimoff, Catania, &
Matthews, 1981) and self-generated rules (Leander et al., 1968; Vyse,
1991) in participants' insensitivity to prevailing schedules, a between-
subjects design was chosen in which each participant was exposed to a
single schedule of point delivery for nonverbal responding. Finally, in
most previous investigations of rule discovery, only nonverbal
responding has been reinforced, creating a motivational context that
favors nonverbal behavior over the development of accurate
contingency statements. As a result, in the present experiment
participants were instructed to discover how points were earned and not
to be concerned with the total number of points obtained. The primary
dependent variable was the verbal behavior of the participants, and the




Twenty-four students, 10 men and 14 women, from an introductory
psychology course at Connecticut College were randomly assigned to
one of three experimental groups. In exchange for their service, students
received course credit, without regard for their actual performance.
Setting and Apparatus
The experiment was conducted in a 4-m x 4-m windowless room
that contained a table, a chair, and an Apple Macintosh SE computer.
The keyboard was placed directly in front of the monitor, as it might be
arranged for normal use, but the computer's mouse was moved out of
sight. During the session, a five by five matrix of 2-cm x 1.5-cm boxes
was present on the screen, and a 1-cm diameter circle appeared in one
of the boxes.
Procedure
Five self-paced sessions lasting between 5 and 10 min each were
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conducted on a single day. Between sessions, participants left the room
for approximately 3 min while the experimenter prepared the computer
for the next session.
Upon entering the experimental room for the first time, the
participant sat in front of the computer, and the experimenter read the
following instructions:
This is an experiment in problem solving. Using the "Z" key and the
"/" key you will be able to earn points on the computer. The most
important thing for you to do is to discover how points are earned.
The total number of points you earn is not important. Try to come to
as complete an understanding of the task as you can. When you are
ready to begin, press the space bar.
The matrix was not visible at this time, but the message "When you are
ready to begin, press the SPACE BAR" was displayed on the computer
monitor. The experimenter answered any questions by merely rereading
the relevant section of the instructions and left the room. No additional
instructions were given on subsequent sessions.
When the participant initiated the session by pressing the space bar,
the matrix appeared on the computer screen. At the beginning of each of
the 50 trials per session, the circle appeared in the upper left-hand box of
the matrix. A press on the "Z" key produced a tone and moved the circle
down one box; a press on the "/" key also produced a tone but moved the
circle to the right one box. Pressing any other key had no programmed
effect. When a point was earned, the matrix disappeared, a feedback tone
was presented, and during the 2-s interval the current point total was
shown with the message "ADD ONE POINT." Points were earned for
sequences of key presses that moved the circle from the upper left-hand
corner to the lower right-hand corner: eight-press combinations that
contained four left (Z) presses and four right (/) presses. A fifth press on
either key would immediately produce a blank white screen and a 2-s
intertrial interval.
At the end of the session, the screen displayed the total points
obtained and the message, "END OF ROUND [session number] PLEASE
SEE EXPERIMENTER."
Experimental conditions. The three experimental conditions differed
only in the schedule of point delivery. For those in the FR 1 group,
participants earned a point for any sequence of four left and four right key-
presses. In the FR 2 condition, a point was earned on alternate trips
through the matrix, and in the RR 2 condition, a random 50% of sequences
received a point. In each case, participants were exposed to the same
contingency in all five sessions of the experiment.
Rule statements. Rule statements describing the matrix task were
requested in the form of performance descriptions. Following the fifth
session, the participant was given a pen and a piece of paper with the
question "What do you have to do to earn points?" written on it. Participants
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were given as much time as they needed to write an answer to the
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Figure 1. Individual plots of the key-pressing behavior of participants in the FR 1 group.
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Figure 2. Individual plots of the key-pressing behavior of participants in the FR 2 group.
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Figure 3. Individual plots of the key-pressing behavior of participants in the RR 2 group.
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Results
Nonverbal behavior. Figures 1, 2, and 3 show individual graphs of
the nonverbal behavior of participants in the FR 1, FR 2, and RR 2
conditions. The frequency of the dominant sequence adopted by each
participant is indicated, as well as the total number of sequences used in
each session and the total points per session.
Single factor analyses of variance revealed that participants in the
three experimental conditions did not differ in either the total number of
sequences used (summed across the five sessions) or the total
frequency of participants' dominant sequences. This result indicates that
the levels of behavioral variability and stereotypy in each group were
equivalent. In addition, the number of points earned by participants in
the FR 2 and RR 2 conditions were not significantly different.
Despite the lack of group differences, individual participants differed
markedly in their levels of behavioral stereotypy. For example, in the FR
1 condition, IJ and DS showed relatively high levels of stereotypy, using
their dominant sequences in over 80% of the trials of three sessions. In
contrast, KG, JM, and especially KK showed relatively high levels of
behavioral variability as indicated by higher numbers of sequences used
in each session. Similar individual differences in stereotypy/variability
can be seen in the other groups.
Verbal behavior. The students' written answers to the question "What
do you have to do to earn points?" were categorized as either superstitious
or nonsuperstitious. To be considered superstitious, a rule statement had to
include at least one of the following characteristics: (a) mention of specific
sequences or paths through the matrix that had to be used to earn a point,
(b) mention of specific squares or areas of the matrix board that had to be
entered, passed through, or avoided, or (c) mention of some other
unprogrammed contingency (e.g., "you have to do pattern A on the first
trial, then pattern B on the next one"). Based on these criteria, one
participant from the FR 1 group (MP), two participants from the FR 2 group
(CD and CS) and six participants from the RR 2 group (DC, FG, SL, AV,
ES, and SY) produced superstitious rule statements. The specific results
are presented in the Appendix. Verbal responses are labeled superstitious
or nonsuperstitious, and superstitious statements are marked a, b, or c to
indicate which criteria were met. In addition, the specific superstitious
statements appear in italics.
A Fisher's Exact Test indicated that the number of superstitious rule
statements in the two FR groups were not significantly different (p = .40);
however, significantly more superstitious rule statements were observed
in the RR group than in the FR groups (p = .012). Participants in the RR
group also were significantly more likely to make statements of
uncertainty about their solutions (e.g., "I never fully figured out when it
would give me points") than participants in the other groups (p - .013).
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Discussion
Using a task similar to the one used in this study, Schwartz (1982)
found that reinforcement created behavioral stereotypy, which in turn
was associated with inaccurate descriptions of the experimental
contingencies. Several participants in the present investigation showed
behavioral stereotypy (e.g., IJ, DS, SK, and KD), but in this case,
stereotyped nonverbal behavior was not correlated with superstitious
rule statements. Indeed the opposite relationship was seen in the RR
group: Participants who produced nonsuperstitious rule statements had
significantly higher levels of behavioral stereotypy (higher frequencies of
dominant sequences), f(6) = 3.50, p< .05, co2 = .58.
Consistent with the results of an earlier investigation (Vyse, 1991),
the present study has shown that, when a problem solving task allows
for behavioral variability, random consequences can engender
superstitious descriptions of the environmental demands. The different
results observed in the FR 2 and RR 2 conditions suggest that this effect
is created by the inconsistency of consequences and not merely by their
intermittency. Furthermore, these results were obtained under conditions
in which the participants were instructed to find the rule and not to
maximize points; thus, errors in rule discovery cannot be attributed to
motivational conditions that favored nonverbal over verbal behavior.
Because the experimental conditions did not provide motivation for
earning points, it is not clear whether these superstitious rules would
control nonverbal behavior. The present study represents an
examination of rule generation rather than rule governance. However,
previous research provides evidence that similarly generated
superstitious rules can control nonverbal responding (e.g., Vyse, 1991).
Although behavioral variability may lead to more accurate rule
generation in some operant contexts (e.g, Schwartz, 1982 and the
present FR 1 contingency), it is poorly suited to others. The two
participants in the RR condition who produced the highest frequencies of
dominant sequences (greater behavioral stereotypy) also produced the
only nonsuperstitious rule statements. In this condition, there were two
sources of variability: the matrix of possible patterns (sequences) and
the random schedule of point delivery. To be successful under these
circumstances, the participants had to approach the task scientifically
and hold one of these variables constant. The only way to do this was to
adopt a stereotyped sequence of responses. Such a strategy eliminates
the adventitious reinforcement of particular sequences and appears to
make it more likely that random point delivery will be described as such.
SK's verbal response demonstrates a different relationship of
behavioral stereotypy to problem solving. Under the FR 2 contingency,
nonverbal behavior produced points that were intermittent but not
random. Thus the only source of variability was produced by the matrix
of possible response sequences. SK's written solution said:
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By round 2, I was moving the circle the same way every time. I gave
up trying to find a pattern because I realized I was getting a point
every other time, no matter how I moved the circle.
The plot of SK's key-pressing behavior is consistent with this report,
showing higher levels of variability in the first two sessions and almost
complete stereotypy after this point. Thus, in contrast to the RR
condition, behavioral variability was associated with rule discovery, and
(according to the participant's statement) behavioral stereotypy emerged
after the solution had been found.
When a shaman's rain-making ritual is not followed by the end of a
drought, sometimes the power of the shaman is questioned (as well it
should be), but on other occasions, the failure is attributed to some error
in the execution of the ritual (Falk, 1986). In our own, everyday lives we
sometimes execute sequences of responses that are only inconsistently
rewarded. Starting a car in cold weather, taking a college exam, rolling
dice in a craps game, and buying a candy bar from a vending machine
are all activities that involve a sequence of responses that may only be
intermittently reinforced. If pulling the vending machine plunger does not
result in the presentation of a candy bar, the disappointed consumer
may attribute this failure to having inserted the coins too forcefully or not
forcefully enough. The present study suggests that these inaccurate
tacts—or, in cognitive terms, misattributions—are more likely when the
consequences of nonverbal behavior are inconsistent and not merely
intermittent.
Future research should proceed in two directions. First,
investigations of other schedule parameters would establish whether, for
example, richer and leaner schedules of random consequences control
similarly inaccurate rule statements. In addition, the matrix task used in
the current study is designed to allow response variability; however, it is
unclear whether this is a necessary condition for the development of
superstit ious rules. Experimentation with different response
requirements and discriminative stimuli would thus help to further specify
the conditions for accurate and inaccurate rule discovery.
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Appendix
Verbatim Written Responses of Participants in Each Condition
[The participant's initials and the classification of the rule statement
(superstitious/nonsuperstitious) are given at the beginning of each response.
Where the contingency description is classified as superstitious, the
superstitious statements are italicized and the criterion or criteria met are labeled
a, b, or c. See text for further explanation.]
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Fixed Ratio 1
DS—nonsuperstitious. To earn points I had to move the circle to the
diagonally opposite square on the grid, in my sequence, as long as it got there.
To do this I had to use the Z and slash (/) moved it down, these were the only
directions I was able to move the circle.
KK—nonsuperstitious. You don't have to earn points. Because in order for
the program to go on you can still clear the screen w/out gaining pts. It seems as
though it is fixed just under a certain number of trials.
In order to earn a pt. you have to get to the lower right corner box without
going off the screen.
KC—nonsuperstitious. To earn points you have to get the ball to the square
that is in the right hand corner. You can do that by using the Z or the / in any
combination, making sure that you don't go too far to the right or too far down or
you don't receive a point. Every pattern I tested gave me a point when I reached
the bottom right hand corner.
U—nonsuperstitious. You must progress from the upper left-hand corner of the
grid to the lower right-hand corner by moving down and across—you may not go
backwards horizontally or upwards vertically as this will mean a failure to earn points.
In other words, once you reach the bottom of the grid and press the vertical key you
lose. The same happens if you reach the far side and press the horizontal key.
JM—nonsuperstitious. You must move the circle that is in the top left hand
corner of a 5 square x 5 square box into the bottom right corner. If you leave the
5 x 5 box at any time, you get no points. It does not matter in which direction or
pattern that you use. You can only move down or right though. As soon as you
maneuver the ball into the bottom right box, you get a point.
KD—nonsuperstitious. To earn points I had to move the circle from the top
left hand corner of the 16-square grid to the bottom right hand corner. To do this,
I used the 'Z' and the "/' keys—the 'Z' moved the circle down one space, and the
'/' moved it to the right one space. I could not earn a point if I accidentally moved
the circle off the grid.
MP—superstitious (b). Using the Z & / keys on the key board, I had to get
the [circle] from the upper left hand corner of the 25 square grid to the lower right
hand corner. The Z key moved the [circle] down & the / moved it to the right.
The upper right hand corner, and once the lower left hand corner were "out of
bounds" and once the top 2 squares of the left hand column were "out" & I
assumed the entire column was. There were 2 patterns that consistently
produced a point (Z/Z/Z/Z/ and /Z/Z/Z/Z). The patterns ZZ.IIZ2.il and //ZZ//ZZ
worked as well, but I only used them in the last 2 sections. There were sessions
when the circle could not go in the "out of bounds" corners and any pattern that
didn't involve them would result in a point.
JH—nonsuperstitious. To earn points, you must move the circle from the
upper left-hand corner of the grid to the lower right-hand corner of the grid, using
the "Z" (down) and "/" keys. It does not matter what route you take to get to the
lower-right square.
Fixed Ratio 2
RD—nonsuperstitious. The object which starts in the upper left hand corner
has to be moved to the lower right-hand corner. You receive a point every other
time the object reaches this corner.
CS—superstitious (a and c). You have to press the Z tab twice and then the
/ tab until you reach the last square on the bottom right hand corner of the grid.
When the next grid comes on you don't receive any pts. no matter what
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pattern you type in (I tried all kinds of patterns but none of them worked). Using
a step pattern ([drawing of a staircase shape]) you start off by going down 2
boxes (by pressing the Z tab twice) then you go across one box (by pressing
the / tab. Continue this pattern until you reach the bottom right hand square..
On the 3rd grid you press the / tab twice and then the Z tab until you get to
the bottom right hand comer. On the 4th grid you don't receive any pts. no
matter what you do. Using the step pattern ([drawing of a staircase shape]) you
first go across 2 boxes (pressing the / tab twice) and then moving down one box
(by pressing the Z tab once). You continue this pattern (2 across, 1 down) until
you reach the bottom-right had corner box.
Therefore, every other grid gets a point if you follow the above instructions.
SK—nonsuperstitious. I moved the circle from the starting square to the
bottom right-hand square. Every other time I did this, I earned a point. At first I
thought there was a set pattern, but by round 2, I was moving the circle the
same way every time. I gave up trying to find a pattern because I realized I was
getting a point every other time, no matter how I moved the circle.
BH—nonsuperstitious. To earn points, you have to move the cursor from the
top left square down to the bottom right square two times. In other words, the
first time you move the cursor there, there will be no apparent result, but the next
time you will receive a point. It does not matter what pattern of movement you
use to get there. If you move the cursor out of the box, never reaching the
bottom right square, it will not count to get you points. But it will also not interfere
in having to reach the bottom right two times. In other words, if you have
reached the destination once already, you can go out of bounds as many times
as you want, but the second time you reach the destination, you will receive the
point.
You can move any way to get to the destination. It is merely getting there
that will give you points. You need not repeat the same pattern both times to
receive points.
At no time did I receive a point on the first try.
CD—superstitious (b and c). Every other screen there is the possibility of
earning a point by going out in the bottom right corner either from the top or left
side. If you go from the left you have to land one the one above the left first then
go down and right. From the top you simply have to go down. The two
possibilities can be switched by going out on any of the right or bottom boxes.
The computer is set up to do only one of the two possibilities at one time.
To switch to the other choice you can go out any of the boxes on the right side
or bottom, excluding the bottom right corner.
If I began using one pattern which worked in the beginning, it would work
consistently. However, I had no choice as to which pattern I began with. To
switch patterns I had to go out either right side or the bottom.
CJ—nonsuperstitious. To earn points you had to go from one corner to the
other. This could be accomplished by pushing a series of keys down and over or
over and down. It seemed that you could only earn pts. every other try. Also, if
you went off the grid by pushing the wrong keys, you wouldn't score the next
time. Any pattern really seemed to work scoring every other time. No matter
what the pattern was you couldn't score every time.
WM—nonsuperstitious. You earn points by moving the "[circle]" to the lower
(farthest) right hand corner of the grid. You must move the circle to this grid
square twice to get a point. On the first time in a series the screen will disappear
for a moment and it will appear that you will have to start over again. The
sequence that I used to move the circle to the lower right grid square was not
significant to getting the point.
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BF—nonsuperstitious. No points are earned if you move off the board.
If piece is moved to lower right hand box, points are earned every other time
piece is moved to that box. Pattern of moving piece to get to box is irrelevant;
alternating keys, moving all the way across and then down (or vice versa) or any
other pattern used in moving piece. No matter what path is taken to lower right
hand box, points are earned on every other time box is reached.
Random Ratio 2
AV—superstitious (a and c). Go by a certain pattern. The patterns run in
4's. First one [drawing], then [drawing], then I don't know, then [drawing]. But it
could be a certain key that needed to be hit every time. If you missed one then
the pattern went on anyway. The pattern seemed to be running in 3's then in
4;s. I don't know if there was a real 3rd pattern solution. If I could have figured
out the 3rd pattern I would get a pt. every time.
SL—superstitious (a). Get to the lower right hand corner, but there are many
ways to get there and you have to take the correct way to earn a point. Either
[drawing] or [drawing] or [drawing] or [drawing] usually worked at some point.
The most frequent was [drawing]. Some times other patterns worked, but the 4
patterns above were easy to use consistently (easy path to remember) and one
always worked.
ES—superstitious (c). I earned points by moving the [circle] from the top left
hand corner to the bottom right hand corner. I tried many different lateral and
horizontal combinations, some of which worked and some which didn't. / am
sure there was some specific method for when the cursor gave points and when
it didn't, but all I could tell was that it was a random process. As long as I got it
to the rt. hand comer and did something else it gave points. I do not know what
the something else was. Sometimes I did a certain combination twice or did the
opposite combinations and I got points for both.
SY—superstitious (c). You have to move the circle from the starting corner
to the opposite corner of the box using different patterns of movement to get
there. You have to move the circle on one half of the square to the opposite
corner and the next time was to go on the other side of the square. I received
points for a certain pattern sometimes and other times I would not get points for
the same pattern. Later the pattern could be used to get points. I never figured
out exactly how to earn points.
FG—superstitious (c). Reach the lower right hand corner based on some
sort of pattern, sometimes certain patterns worked sometimes they didn't.
Whenever a point was scored I would repeat the pattern again until it stopped
giving me points. I never fully figured out when it would give me points or not.
One of the patterns that I did find worked was to go through the following four
steps [drawings of a sequence of four patterns]. However this was not always
successful. Usually pattern 4 stopped before the other 3.
DC—superstitious (b). You must use the "/" key to move right, and the "Z"
key to move down and maneuver the circle to the lower right corner, from the
upper left one. Points are scored by moving into the square from the top or side,
and only one of those ways will score a point each round. There is only one way
to get a point and it changes from each round. It could be gotten, for instance,
by moving into the square from the side, in which case moving into it from the
top that turn would have been incorrect. The next turn, the correct way could be
to move in from the top, and not from the side. It was possible to have the
correct way repeat itself in succession (i.e. correct way to get a point would be
to go in from the side once, and the next round as well). The sequencing of the
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D0int scoring seemed to be random at most times and each time that a
sequence seemed logical it would change back to being random again. For
example, going in from the side twice, then from the side twice would all elicit a
point, but then the sequence would change, and it was no longer possible to
score points through that sequence.
KD—nonsuperstitious. To earn a point I moved the sphere from the upper
left-hand corner to the lower right-hand corner. Every path that I made the
sphere follow worked (earned a point) but not every time. The sum of all the
failed attempts (going off the board by accident or just not earning a point at the
lower right hand square) and all the points earned was 50 or 51.
I didn't earn a point every time. The relationship between points and failures
wasn't constant. I counted the earned points and failures in an attempt to find a
relationship. I didn't find one. The points earned and failures didn't seem to be
related at all.
KJ—nonsuperstitious. I have absolutely no clue. Completely random—what
I did to get points.
